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ABSTRACT
The National Computer Security Center's (NCSC) Computer Security
Requirements -- Guidance for Applying the DoD TCSEC in Specific
Environments (CSC-STD-003-85) describes an environmental evaluation process
which can be utilized to determine the level of trust required in a given Local
Area Network (LAN) system for processing sensitive information. This thesis
investigates the environmental evaluation process and applies it to the LAN








n. COMPUTER SECURITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3
III. STANDARD FOR TRUSTED SYSTEMS 7
A. THE ORANGE BOOK 7
1. The Criteria - A Security Evaluation Metric 7
2. Control Objectives 9
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE ORANGE BOOK 10
IV. GUIDELINES FOR NETWORK SECURITY 14
A. TRUSTED NETWORK TECHNOLOGY (TNT) PUBLICATIONS 14
1. Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) 14
2. Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guidelines
(TNIEG) 15
B. RISK ASSESSMENT - A METHODOLOGY FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT 15
1. Risk Analysis 16
2. Risk Assessment 17
V. NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT 19
A. TNI PART I SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 19
B. TNI PART II SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 21
1. Determination of Part II Risk 24
2. Suength of Mechanism Requirement 26





4. Functionality Requirement 29
VL NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT: A CASE STUDY 30
A. BACKGROUND 30
B. TACAMOLAN 32
C. ADP OFFICER PLAN OF ATTACK 3 3
D. PHASE I - TNI PART I RISK ASSESSMENT OF VQ-7 34
1. Step 1 : Determine system security mode of operation 34
2. Step 2: Determine minimum user clearance or authorization
rating 34
3. Step 3: Determine maximum data sensitivity rating 35
4. Step 4: Determine risk index 35
5. Step 5: Determine minimum security evaluation class for
computer-based controls 35
6. Step 6: Determine adjustments to computer security
evaluation class required 36
E. PHASE I - TNI PART II RISK ASSESSMENT OF VQ-7 36
1. Functionality 36
2. Strength of Mechanism 36
3. Assurance 37
4. Part II Assurance Rating versus Minimum Part I Evaluation 37
VII. NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT: ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSIONS 39
A. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 39
B. COMMENTS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 42
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 44
1. Phase II - Identify, procure, and implement "trusted
products" 44
2. Phase III - Certification and accreditation (C & A) of trusted
systems 45




A. FEDERAL REGULATIONS 50
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY POLICY 50
C. SECURITY STANDARDS 51
APPENDIX D 52
A. CLEARANCES 52





B. COMMUNICATIONS FIELD INTEGRITY 60
C. NON-REPUDIATION 61
D. DENIAL OF SERVICE 61
E. PROTOCOL BASED DOS PROTECTION 62
F. NETWORK MANAGEMENT 63
G. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 64
H. TRAFFIC FLOW CONFIDENTIALITY 64





B. COMMUNICATIONS FIELD INTEGRITY 66
C. NON-REPUDIATION 67
D. DENIAL OF SERVICE 67
E. PROTOCOL BASED DOS PROTECTION 68
F. NETWORK MANAGEMExNT ; 68
G. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 68
H. TRAFFIC FLOW CONFIDENTIALITY 69
I. SELECTIVE ROUTING 69
LIST OF REFERENCES 70
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 72
vn
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This thesis is dedicated to my wife Laura and my children Nicole and






The United States Navy entered the office automation (OA) systems age in
the 1980's and now, in the 1990's, looks forward to anticipated benefits from
newer technologies. The Navy's aviation squadrons are currently using stand
alone microcomputers in their work place. Since their introduction in the 1980's,
these microcomputers, or OA systems, have improved the capability and
effectiveness of the operational units that employ them. These systems "have
generally increased the productivity of the administrative personnel by allowing
each (person) to produce more information of a higher quality than was
previously possible in a manual mode." (McMican, 1985) New computer
technologies are now promising even greater improvements in administrative
productivity and efficiency. The local area network (LAN) is one of these new
technologies.
The Navy has already begun to plan and implement LAN technology in its
organizational units. Many of the Navy's ships already have networks installed
and new ships, such as the aircraft carrier GEORGE WASHINGTON, are now
being designed to incorporate them from the start. Another example of LAN
technology implementation is the Naval Aviation Logistics Command
Management Information System (NALCOMIS). This system is designed to
automate the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) business functions
and to implement a standardized management system. Planning for the
implementation of LANs in aviation squadrons is also underway.
"COMNAVAIRPAC has plans to provide funding for LANs at the squadron level
in the coming years." (Shannon, 1992)
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B. PROBLEM
COMNAVAIRPAC has identified the need for their squadron LANs to
handle multiple levels of classified information up to but not greater than secret.
The design and implementation of such a LAN raises several questions. What
security issues should be considered in the design phase of a LAN with this
requirement? What Department of Defense (DoD) directives and National
Computer Security Center (NCSC) guidelines must be adhered to? How is the
level of trust required for a particular LAN determined? How is a LAN certified
and accredited to operate at a particular level of trust?
G OBJECTIVE
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) provides guidance on
security in networks through the Trusted Network Technology (TNT)
publications. The TNT includes the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) and the
Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline (TNIEG). For now, the
TNT publications provide the only guidance available.
The objective of this thesis is to survey the TNT publications, focusing on the
risk management methodologies that they describe. Specifically, the risk
assessment methodology used to determine the minimum security requirements
for a network will be analyzed in detail and applied to a hypothetical aviation
squadron. The results of this application will be summarized and used as the basis
for trusted network design recommendations.
Background information on networks and security can be obtained from the
recommended readings listed in Appendix A.
II. COMPUTER SECURITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Computer security is not a new issue. Early computer security activities date
back to the 1950's with the development of the first TEMPEST 1 standard and the
establishment of the U.S. Communications Security (COMSEC) Board.
Government and industry had become concerned about the possibility of
compromising classified information by electronic eavesdropping. "Studies of
signal interception and decoding have borne out these speculations." (Russell
and Gangemi, 1991) It was not until the 1960's, however, that computer security
received recognition as a serious issue. A Joint Computer Conference was held in
the Spring of 1967 and is considered one of the first comprehensive computer
security presentations. It covered a variety of threats ranging from
electromagnetic radiation to unauthorized programmer and user access to systems
and data. This presentation, however, was merely an introduction to the possible
vulnerabilities and did not include discussions on how to counter these threats.
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
In 1967, the Defense Science Board sponsored the establishment of a task
force within the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) that began an
examination of computer system and network vulnerabilities. The task force was
to examine, identify and introduce methods for protecting and controlling access
to the government computer systems and information. The task force published a
report after two years of study called Security Controls for Computer Systems.
This report is considered to be a significant publication in the history of computer
security. "Its recommendations, and the research that followed its publication, led
^EMPEST refers to the U.S. government program established to combat the
electromagnetic emanations problem. It also refers to technology that
contains or suppresses signal emanations from electronic equipment. (Russell
and Gangemi, 1991)
to a number of programs dedicated to protecting classified information and
setting standards for protection." (Russell and Gangemi, 1991) The
recommendations of this report also led to DoD's development of regulations for
enforcing security of computer systems, networks, and data processed by DoD.
In 1972, DoD established a policy for computer controls and techniques titled
Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems (DoD
Directive 5200.28). This directive mandated the protection of both computer
system equipment and data from unauthorized access and manipulation.
DoD continued its computer security efforts in the 1970's by sponsoring
initiatives in three categories: tiger teams, security research studies, and
development of the first secure operating systems. Tiger teams were used to
detect and attempt to fix computer security problems. They were of limited use
since one tiger team often found flaws that another tiger team had missed
previously.
The security research studies resulted in a couple of important concepts. One
concept was a reference monitor, an entity that "enforces the authorized access
relationships between subjects and objects of a system." (Anderson, 1972; Russell
and Gangemi 1991) A subject is a person, process or device that causes
information flow among objects. An object is a passive entity that contains or
receives information such as files, directories, programs and printers. This concept
was used in the development of standards and technologies for secure systems.
Another important concept was the development of security policy models. This
concept has two parts, the security policy and the security model. The security
policy is a set of laws, rules and practices that regulate the management,
protection, and distribution of sensitive information. The security model refers to
the mechanisms required to enforce the security policy. Bell and LaPadula [1976]
were the first to develop a mathematical model of a multi-level security policy.
This model "was central to the development of basic computer security standards
and laid the groundwork for a number of later security models, and their
application in government security standards." (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Much of the secure systems development research conducted in the 1970's
focused on working models of security kernels. This concept involves building
the operating system with a portion (kernel) devoted to controlling the access to
system resources. One of the successful developments using this concept was the
Multics (Multiplexed Information Computing Service) system funded by the Air
Force. Its well designed security features provided a model example for the
development of the secure systems that followed.
In the late 1970's, both DoD and the National Bureau of Standards (NBS)
(now NIST) organized a number of seminars and invitational workshops
involving government and industry experts in computer technology and security.
The DoD seminars focused on answering the following questions. "Are secure
computer systems useful and feasible? What mechanisms should be developed to
evaluate and approve secure computer systems? How can computer vendors be
encouraged to develop secure computer systems?" (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
This initiative by DoD was known as the DoD Computer Security Initiative and
its goal was to bring attention to computer security issues. This initiative was
successful in that the attention it received led to a second important initiative
from NBS. A series of NBS Invitational Workshops made significant progress
toward the development of standards for secure systems. The attending
computer experts reported that they identified three areas that required specific
attention to achieve security. (1) Policy: What security rules should be enforced
for sensitive information?; (2) Mechanisms: What hardware and software
mechanisms are needed to enforce the policy?; and (3) Assurance: What needs
to be done to make a convincing case that the mechanisms do support the policy
even when the system is subject to threats?
Once the questions had been asked, the task of answering them had to be
assigned. The Mitre Corporation was tasked with the development of the first set
of computer security evaluation criteria for the use of assessing the degree of trust
that could be placed in a computer system that protected classified data. The
Invitational Workshops also led to follow-on public seminars conducted by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense concerning the DoD Computer Security
Initiative. As a result, the National Security Agency (NSA) received new
responsibility for information security and established the DoD Computer
Security Center (CSC) within NSA in 1981. Its basic charter was to continue and
expand upon the work started by the DoD Computer Security Initiative. Four
years later, the CSC's name was changed to the National Computer Security
Center (NCSC) when its responsibilities for computer security expanded to
include all federal agencies. Appendix B contains a listing of the NCSC's goals.
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
III. STANDARD FOR TRUSTED SYSTEMS
A. THE ORANGE BOOK
The NCSC's charter to continue the work started by the DoD Computer
Security Initiative and the MITRE Corporation led to the development of
evaluation criteria that could be used to quantify computer security. These
criteria were published in the DoD 5200.28-STD, Department of Defense Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). The Orange Book, as it is
commonly referred to because of its color, became the bible of secure computer
system development.
1. The Criteria - A Security Evaluation Metric
The Orange Book defines the criteria used to classify systems based on
the level of trust that can be placed in a computer system. The criteria were
developed to ( 1 ) provide guidance to manufacturers as to what to build into their
computer security products, (2) provide computer users with a metric for
determining the level of trust that can be placed in systems that process classified
or other sensitive information and (3) provide a standard that can be followed in
computer product acquisition specifications. (DoD, 1985)
The TCSEC specifies a "secure" computing system as one that will
control access to information, such that only properly authorized individuals, or
processes operating on their behalf, will have access to read, write, create or
delete information. There are four major divisions of criteria that are structured in
a hierarchical fashion: D, C, B and A. Division A identifies systems with the most
stringent protection and division D identifies those systems that have been
evaluated and found to offer unacceptable security protection.
Division A provides the most comprehensive security protection
(Verified Protection). However, it is difficult to implement and difficult to
evaluate. The definition of division A follows.
Division A requires the use of formal security methods to assure that the
mandatory and discretionary security controls, employed in the network
system, can effectively protect classified or other sensitive information stored
or processed by the system. Extensive documentation is required to
demonstrate that the NTCB (Network Trusted Computing Base) meets the
security requirements in all aspects of design, development, and
implementation. (NCSC, 1987)
Division B (Mandatory Protection) requires more stringent controls and
testing than Division C but is easier to develop and evaluate than Division A.
Division B is based on the integrity of required sensitivity labels. It uses
sensitivity labels to enforce a set of "mandatory" access control rules (NCSC,
1987). The sensitivity labels must be carried with all information in the network.
Division B contains three classes (Bl, B2, and B3). Class Bl requires
the features specified at its division level. Class B2 and B3 require more suingent
controls and move beyond the basic requirements toward the requirements of
division A.
Division C provides discretionary (need-to-know) protection,
identification/authentication capabilities, and accountability of subjects (users/
processes started by them) and the actions they initiate via audit capabilities.
Audit capabilities are used to track a subject's use or modification of an object,
providing a means of holding users (subjects) accountable for their actions. Class
CI requires the features of Division C but does not require an audit trail. Class
C2 enforces a more stringent discretionary access control (DAC) than CI by
requiring auditing of security-relevant events and resource encapsulation. (DoD,
1985)
Division D is reserved for those systems or LAN's that do not meet one
of the preceding divisions and is considered to provide only minimal protection.
2. Control Objectives
In addition to the seven criteria described above, general control
objectives were developed to give guidance in designing trusted computer
systems. The conuol objectives are security policy, accountability, assurance and
documentation.
Security policy is a statement of intent that specifies the control to be
used for access and dissemination of sensitive information. Accountability refers
to the ability of the system to assure individual accountability based on the type
of security policy invoked. Assurance refers to the systems ability to ensure
accurate interpretation of the security policy during operation and throughout
the system's life-cycle. Documentation refers to user guides, manuals and other
written documents that support each class.
Each control objective described above is made up of a group of
requirements. "These groupings were developed to assure that (these) control
objectives for computer security are satisfied and not overlooked" (DoD, 1985).
The Orange Book contains a more detailed discussion of the control objectives
and their requirements.
Table 1 shows the relationship between the Orange Book evaluation
criteria and the control objectives for trusted computer systems. It depicts the
changes in requirements between each class.
TABLE 1
TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA
SUMMARY CHART






Exportation of Labeled Information Security
Exportation of Multilevel Devices Policy









System Integrity 'If ""i"" j j
Security Testing
Design Specification and Verification
Covert Channel Analysis




Security Features User's Guide I^^^B •>:.:::.HBBMB ''y-yyyy:-':'
Trusted Facility Manual Documentation
Test Documentation HHS9HB «''-''. fl M m
Design Documentation
| I
No requirements for this class
New or enhanced requirements for this class
I
"j No additional requirements for this class
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991; DoD, 1985)
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE ORANGE BOOK
Russell and Gangemi [1991] have identified a few of the major claims against
the Orange Book by some respected security practitioners. The cited Orange
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Book inadequacies are: the Orange Book model targets the government classified
environment only versus the commercial environment; the Orange Book's narrow
focus on only one security principle - secrecy; the Orange Book emphasis on
unauthorized access protection from external intruders versus the possibility of
intrusion from insiders; the Orange Book's failure to address network issues; and
the Orange Book's failure to offer more than just a few, limited security ratings.
When the Orange Book (TCSEC) was issued in 1985, its objective was, and
still is, to "provide a basis for the evaluation of effectiveness of security controls
built into automatic data processing system products." (DoD, 1985) It was not
intended to be a comprehensive document that addresses all computer security
issues. Although the TCSEC was designed to be application-independent, the
NCSC recognized that the security requirements specified by the criteria would
eventually have to be adapted or expanded in order to apply them to other types
of computer systems (i.e., networks and data bases), each having their own
functional requirements or special environments. The TCSEC criteria and
technical evaluation methodologies provide an important reference foundation
for new computer technologies. Improvements to the Orange Book criteria and
their methodologies have been identified and further research and debate are
being solicited via technical reports. (NCSC, 1991)
The NCSC designed and implemented Technical Guidelines Program to
ensure that the features of the TCSEC are discussed in detail and that guidance is
provided for meeting the different requirements of evolving computer
technologies. This program has resulted in over 20 publications that have
become collectively known as the Rainbow Series because of the different colors
used for their covers. Many of these technical guidelines have addressed the
1 1
Orange Book shortcomings mentioned earlier. However, others have yet to be
addressed in future revisions of the Orange Book.
Although the Orange Book provides a mechanism to make revisions through
a formal review process, no revisions have been made since its original issue in
1985. So far, the only evidence of a revision to the Orange Book is an NCSC
technical report, Integrity-oriented Control Objectives: Proposed Revisions to
the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), published in
October of 1991. This technical report has been issued as a proposed change to a
specific section of the Orange Book, namely, the control objectives. "This
document proposes new and revised versions of the control objectives .... and (is)
intended to be used as a strawman to foster further research and debate aimed at
developing a new or revised set of product evaluation criteria that addresses
integrity as well as confidentiality" (NCSC, 1991). Although this technical report
focuses on only one aspect of the Orange Book criteria (control objectives) it
does state that further research and debate is needed before the proposal is
adopted. It is not clear, however, how long this process will take and what affect
each specific revision will have individually or as a whole on the updating of the
Orange Book.
Tannis [1988] cites the technical guidelines development process itself as
another shortcoming. The NCSC originally implemented its Technical Guidelines
Program with a policy that dictated guideline production in a serial manner and
was based on the perceived urgency of addressing specific computer security
issues. Addressing the many areas of information security (INFOSEC) in a serial
manner did not, however, meet the ever growing demands for guidance in the
application of new computer technologies. As a result, the NCSC adopted a new
policy that dictated the use of its resources in concurrent efforts. This new policy
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of concurrent guidelines development, however, is the root of a shortcoming in
the technical guidelines development process.
Concurrent development of technical guidelines does not provide for
collaboration between different groups of Technical Guidelines Division
personnel conducting individual research on separate security issues. Since many
of the computer security issues being addressed by the Technical Guidelines
Program are closely inter-related, there may be duplication of effort. Additionally,
without a concerted effort by the Technical Guidelines Division personnel on
these inter-related issues, it may be difficult to produce guidelines that consider all
aspects of a particular security issue and minimize redundant efforts.
Unfortunately, the Technical Guidelines Program addresses only one computer
security issue per effort and does not provide a means for collaboration. Since
each security issue to be researched is isolated from other inter-related issues, the
real-world affects of one issue versus many others is lacking in the guideline that
results. (Tannis, 1988)
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IV. GUIDELINES FOR NETWORK SECURITY
A. TRUSTED NETWORK TECHNOLOGY (TNT) PUBLICATIONS
The NCSC's ongoing research and invitational workshops led to the drafting
of the Trusted Network Technology (TNT) publications. These technical
publications were developed to provide guidance on how new security
technology should be used. The first of these publications was the Trusted
Network Interpretation (TNI) of the TCSEC. The TNI was issued as an addition
to the Rainbow Series in 1987 and added "interpretation and rationale to
applying trust technology to network systems." (NCSC, 1990) The second of
these publications was the Trusted Network Interpretation Environments
Guideline (TNIEG) issued in 1990. The TNIEG provides guidance on the use of
the TNI. It helps to identify the security protection required in different network
environments.
The TNI and TNIEG do not cover all of the necessary security requirements
that should be considered in a trusted network. They provide "the best guidance
that is available at this time." As technology continues to advance and research
produces improved computer security methodologies, additional guidance will be
provided. (NCSC, 1990)
1. Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI)
The TNI was written to serve the same purpose for networked systems
that the TCSEC does for general purpose computers. Essentially, it extends the
classes and criteria to trusted network systems and components. The document is
divided into two parts. Part I provides inteipretations of TCSEC security features
and assurance requirements. Its evaluation system is identical to that of TCSEC
(Arsenault, 1987). Part II of the TNI describes additional security services (e.g.,
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communications integrity, denial of service, transmission security) that are of
significant concern in the network environment. ( NCSC, 1987)
2. Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guidelines (TNIEG)
In 1990, the Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline
(TNIEG) was issued to provide "insight into the issues relevant when integrating,
operating, and maintaining trusted computer networks" (NCSC, 1990).
Specifically, the TNIEG describes many issues that can arise when determining
security requirements in different network environments. As stated earlier, the
TNIEG does not address all of the possible security protection issues but is
considered "the first step" toward identifying the minimum security protection
required in different environments. (NCSC, 1990)
B. RISK ASSESSMENT - A METHODOLOGY FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT
Computer security requirements are addressed in several federal regulations,
policies, and standards. Appendix C contains an overview of these documents.
The overall computer security policy document for the Department of Defense is
DoD Directive 5200.28, Security Requirements for Automated Information
Systems (AISs). It provides guidance on mandatory and minimum AIS security
requirements.
DoD Directive 5200.28 mandates that a risk management program be used
for the management of DoD computer systems. DoD Directive 5200.28 [1988]
defines risk management as follows:
The total process of identifying, measuring, and minimizing uncertain events
affecting AIS resources. It includes risk analysis, cost benefit analysis,
safeguard selection, security test and evaluation, safeguard implementation,
and systems review.
The risk analysis mentioned in the definition above refers to a methodology
that analyzes AIS "assets and (their) vulnerabilities to establish an expected loss
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from certain events based on estimated probabilities of occurrence" (DoD, 1988).
It involves a series of steps that (1) identifies the exposures of an AIS, (2)
identifies possible controls and their costs for each exposure, and (3) analyzes the
cost and benefit of protecting the AIS from the identified exposures. This risk
analysis methodology, however, differs from the risk assessment methodology
described in the TNIEG (and mandated by DoD Directive 5200.28),
Risk assessment refers to the determination of "the recommended (NCSC)
evaluation class (or requirements of an evaluation class) based on a specific
environment" (NCSC, 1990). The environment that it evaluates is characterized
by (1) AIS users possessing different security clearances, and (2) the data
processed on the AIS having different levels of data sensitivity. The risk
assessment methodology compares the environmental factors to determine which
NCSC evaluation rating will provide the necessary security for the AIS.
Appendix D describes user clearances and data sensitivities in detail.
This thesis focuses on the risk assessment methodology and will not address
the other elements of risk management. A brief discussion of risk analysis and risk
assessment is provided below.
1. Risk Analysis
The risk analysis of computer systems is a sub-task of risk management
and is used to establish an overall computer system security policy. Security
planning begins with risk analysis to determine all exposures of a computing
system and the costs of controlling each exposure. A cost-benefit analysis of this
information provides quantifiable answers to questions regarding the cost of a
control versus the cost of asset loss. Several benefits can result from a additional
risk analysis: (1) improved employee awareness; (2) identification of computing
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assets, vulnerabilities, and controls; (3) improved basis for risk versus control
decisions; (4) a means of justifying expenditures for security. (Pfleeger, 1989)
Risk analysis helps to determine how important the computer system is
and how far the organization is willing to go (concerning equipment, people, and
budget) to protect it. The risk analysis is typically structured to: (1) determine an
organizations assets (people, software, hardware and procedures); (2) assess the
nature and size of asset vulnerability to the five main threats (destruction,
modification, disclosure, denial and fraud); (3) estimate the probability of the
threat occurring; (4) estimate the single loss from the threat occurring; (5) estimate
the annualized loss expectancy; (6) devise effective controls or safeguards; (7)
establish a cost-benefit analysis; and (8) select the most cost effective alternatives.
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
2. Risk Assessment
In computer security, the government's most valuable asset is probably
the information that is processed on its computers. There are many security
requirements to be considered. "Depending on the particular environment,
communications security (COMSEC), emanations security (TEMPEST), physical
security, personnel security, administrative security, and other information
security (INFOSEC) measures or safeguards are ... required" (NCSC, 1990).
Enclosure (4) of DoD Directive 5200.28 describes risk assessment as a
procedure that leads to the selection of security services and safeguards that are
appropriate for a given network environment. The risk assessment methodology
compares user clearances and data sensitivities using a series of tables. The
results of the assessment help determine the minimum level of trust recommended
for a specific network environment. The TNIEG relies heavily on this risk
assessment methodology and will provide the basis for its description and
17
application. The details of this environmental risk assessment process will be
described in the chapters that follow.
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V. NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT
A. TNI PART I SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The TNIEG describes a procedure that uses the highest classification of data
and the lowest clearance among system users to compute an overall risk index.
Once computed, the risk index is used to determine the corresponding NCSC-
evaluation rating (TCSEC criteria) required for the system to provide adequate
security.
As discussed earlier, Enclosure (4) of DoD Directive 5200.28 describes risk
assessment in detail. It describes six major steps in assessing risk: (1) determine
system security mode of operation; (2) determine minimum user clearance or
authorization rating; (3) determine maximum data sensitivity rating; (4) determine
risk index; (5) determine minimum security evaluation class for computer-based
controls; and (6) determine adjustments to computer security evaluation class
required. (NCSC, 1987)
The TNIEG uses adaptations from DoD Directive 5200.28 (Enclosure 4) to
illustrate the steps to be followed in determining the risk of a network. The first
step requires the selection of the desired system security mode of operation
(Appendix F). The second step describes the determination of the minimum
clearance or authorization of the network users. Appendix D contains a detailed
description of user clearances. Once this is determined, Table 2 is used to assign a
rating for the minimum user clearance (Rmin).
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TABLE 2
RATING SCALE FOR MINIMUM USER CLEARANCE (Rmin)
Minimum User Clearance Rmin
Uncleared OR Not Authorized (U)





Top Secret (TS) and/or current Background
Investigation (BI)
4
TS and/or current Special Background
Investigation (SBI)
5
One Category (1C) 6
Multiple Categories (MC) 7
(NCSC, 1990)
The third step describes the determination of the maximum sensitivity of data
processed by the network. Appendix D contains a detailed description of data
sensitivities. Appendix E contains all footnotes for the tables that follow. Once
the data sensitivity is determined, it, too, is matched with a table. Table 3 assigns a
rating for the maximum data sensitivity (Rmax).
Using the numbers derived from the tables above, the risk index for a given
network can be calculated using the following formula (NCSC, 1990): Risk
Index = Rmax - Rmin.
The Risk Index is then matched to an additional table (Table 4) that will
provide a minimum NCSC-evaluation rating and the security mode in which that
minimum security class should operate for the network. Appendix F contains
detailed descriptions of each security mode. (NCSC, 1990)
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TABLE 3











Unclassified (U) (J N/A3
Not Classified but
Sensitive (N)4
1 N with one or more Categories 1
Confidential (C) 2 C with one or more Categories 3
Secret (S) 3 S with one or more Categories
only one Category containing S




Top Secret (TS) 55 TS with one or more Categories
only one Category containing S or TS
TS with two or more Categories










Dedicated-*^ No Minimum Class 1 -2
System High C22
1 Multilevel, Partitioned B13







B. TNI PART II SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Part II of the TNI provides a qualitative appraisal of security services in three
aspects: functionality, strength of mechanism, and assurance. Functionality
identifies the objective and the approach of a particular security service that
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includes features, mechanism, and performance. Different applications
environments may require the use of alternative approaches to achieve the
desired functionality. Strength of mechanism identifies how well a particular
approach may achieve its objectives. A mechanisms strength is affected by the
selection of security parameters (such as the number of bits used in a checksum)
and its ability to operate during inadvertent threats (such as natural disasters,
operator errors, and accidents). Assurance refers to the belief that the
functionality will be achieved and includes verifiability, resistance against
circumvention or bypass, and tamper resistance. It is based on the use of formal
or informal analysis of approaches such as validation and verification, testing,
software engineering, and theory. (NCSC, 1990)
TNI Part II concerns itself with end to end threats (between hosts) on the
network. Most of these threats do not occur in stand-alone computers. The
services described above typically use software protocols (rules) in providing
protection against these threats. Additional methods such as encryption may be
utilized to guard against some of these threats, however these additional methods
are not considered in this evaluation. (NCSC, 1990)
Computer technology has advanced rapidly over the last few decades.
Unfortunately, computer security technology has lagged far behind. Although
TNI Part I is well structured and developed, "Part II services have not been
supported by equally well developed theories and detailed evaluation criteria ..."
(NCSC, 1990). As a result, the evaluations of Part II have been designed to be
qualitative rather than hierarchically-ordered like the ratings from the TCSEC.
Table 5 shows the evaluation structure for network security services described in
TNI Part II.
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Each network environment is different and therefore each will have different
needs and requirements for the additional security services described in the TNI
Part II. The TNIEG discussion of the TNI Part II security requirements describes a
guideline that management personnel can use in making the selection decision. A
series of questions helps "determine whether a particular service (shown in Table
5) is required and what functionality is needed" (NCSC, 1990). Appendix G
provides a list of these questions.
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TABLE 5
EVALUATION STRUCTURE FOR NETWORK SECURITY SERVICES



























































(Russell and Gangemi, 1991; NCSC, 1990)
1. Determination of Part II Risk
Although the security requirements in TNI Part II differ from those
discussed in TNI Part I, the process for determining risk in a particular network
environment is quite similar. The TNI Part II risk index is calculated using many of
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the same tables in TNI Part I. Part I calculations involve the lowest cleared (AIS)
user. The risk index calculation for Part II, however, concerns the clearance of
outsiders (non-AIS users) that have physical access to any AIS object. As a
result, each AIS device must be considered separately. "For each (AIS) object in
the system, the lowest clearance of individuals with physical access to that object
is used." The risk index is calculated as: Risk Index = Rmax - Rmin. Table 6,
Minimum Clearance for Physical Access, is identical to Table 2. (NCSC, 1990)
TABLE 6
MINIMUM CLEARANCE FOR PHYSICAL ACCESS
Minimum User Clearance Rmin
Uncleared OR Not Authorized (U)





Top Secret (TS) and/or current Background
Investigation (BI)
4
TS and/or current Special Background
Investigation (SBI)
5
One Category (1C) 6
Multiple Categories (MC) 7
(NCSC, 1990)
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1 N with one or more Categories 2
Confidential (C) 2 C with one or more Categories 3
Secret (S) 3 S with one or more Categories
only one Category containing S




Top Secret (TS) 55 TS with one or more Categories
only one Category containing S or TS
TS with two or more Categories
containing S or TS
6
7
2. Strength of Mechanism Requirement
Measuring the strength of mechanism involves two types of threat--
inadvertent threat and malicious threat. Inadvertent threats are not applicable to
this type of risk assessment. Malicious threats, however, are associated with
physical access to an AIS object or to AIS transmissions. Selection of a
protection mechanism is, therefore, based on the comparison and measurement of
the lowest clearance of non-AIS users having physical access to AIS objects and
the most sensitive information contained on the system. (NCSC, 1990)
Protection of data in a network can be provided by a combination of
several mechanisms: physical, administrative, procedural, and technical.
Although the TNI concerns itself with only the AIS hardware, firmware, software,
and configuration management protections, different service directives and
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organization regulations mandate the use of other protection mechanisms.
(NCSC, 1990)
Table 8 (NCSC, 1990) now gives the strength of mechanism requirement
based on the risk index.
TABLE 8










Trusted computer systems rely on a Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
"Similarly, trusted network systems rely on a Network Trusted Computing Base
(NTCB)" (NCSC, 1990). The NTCB establishes the necessary conditions that
improve the assurance of security services. It ensures that the integrity of
programs is maintained and prevents unauthorized modification to objects within
the network system. Access controls can be employed to isolate services that are
unrelated. The access controls used are typically discretionary and mandatory
access controls. The NTCB also provides the protection of the security and
integrity of information assigned to the network. It ensures that the information
is not weakened the by the various supporting security services. (NCSC, 1990)
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Assurance of Part II and Part I requirements are closely related. This is
because the integrity of the services is dependent upon the protection provided
by the NTCB. This dependence is shown in Table 10. (NCSC, 1990)
TABLE 10








Table 10 matches the Part II assurance ratings for services to the
minimum Part I evaluations that support them. It is important to note that the
Minimum Part I Evaluation in Table 10 may not coincide exactly to the
Evaluation Class calculated previously in Part I Table 4. Part I and Part II
calculate Rmin using different criteria. Part I determines Rmin based on the
minimum clearance or authorization of the network users. Part II determines Rmin
based on the minimum clearance of outsiders who have physical access to
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network components. As a result, the particular network environment will dictate
which requirement (Part I evaluation class or Part II evaluation class) will
dominate.
4. Functionality Requirement
Functionality deals with determining the need or requirement for a
particular security service. As mentioned earlier, the TNIEG provides a list of
questions for each network security service described in TNI Part II that help
identify the functionality required for each service. "The questions should be
answered in sequence, unless the answer to one question contains an instruction
to skip ahead." These questions are provided in Appendix G. (NCSC, 1990)
The services mentioned above are additional security considerations
that arise in association with networks. They address the need for protection
against compromise, denial of service, and unauthorized modification. These
security services, however, may or may not be appropriate for a specific network
environment. The list of questions provided in Appendix G can help management
make an effective selection. (NCSC, 1990)
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VI. NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT: A CASE STUDY
A. BACKGROUND
Historically, the development and implementation of computer systems has
been separate from computer security efforts. As mentioned earlier, computer
security efforts still lag far behind the advancements in computer technology in
general. "(Computer) security engineering and system engineering have been
Ueated as separate disciplines with less than satisfactory results" (Pfleeger, 1992).
This is due to the lack of guidance concerning the development of secure
computer systems as part of the overall computer system engineering process.
Although specific guidance is currently in draft form, many military activities find
themselves adding security features and mechanisms to their computer systems
that are already in place. For the application of this risk assessment, it is assumed
that a hypothetical aviation squadron already has a LAN in place and now wants
to incorporate the necessary computer security mechanisms for a trusted network.
The hypothetical aviation squadron is called Fleet Air Reconnaissance
Squadron 7 (VQ-7). VQ-7 is one of only a few TACAMO 2 squadrons. The
TACAMO project began as the concept of an airborne fleet communications
broadcast system. Over the years TACAMO evolved into a communications
platform serving as a command link to the fleet ballistic missile submarine force.
The importance of their mission requires TACAMO squadrons to process multiple
levels of classified information. Squadron (physical) security is taken seriously.
The squadron spaces are considered a restricted area and are guarded by security
personnel 24 hours a day. Squadron personnel have varying levels of security
TACAMO stands for Take Charge And Move Out.
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clearances (Appendix D) and are required to wear photographic identification
badges that are color coded to indicate their clearance level.
VQ-7 is composed of several departments, each having a department head
(see Appendix H for the VQ-7 organizational chart). As shown in Appendix H,
the Automated Data Processing (ADP) officer billet is in the Special Projects
Department. All billets within the squadron, including the ADP officer billet, are
manned by squadron officers on a rotating basis. Billets are typically held for
one year.
The ADP officer billet is difficult for the squadron to fill. There are no formal
experience requirements that must be met by persons that are assigned to this
billet. The Commanding Officer (CO) will usually Uy to find an officer within the
squadron that has some experience with computers (e.g., undergraduate degree in
computer science) to assign to the ADP officer billet. If there are no officers who
have this type of prior experience, the CO will try to assign an officer that at least
owns a personal computer and has an interest in computers beyond its basic word
processing capabilities.
The current ADP officer for VQ-7 is LT Hines. Although he does not have a
degree in computer science, he does have his own computer and is interested in
computer technology. He has been in the job for two months.
There are other officers in the squadron with backgrounds in computer
technology, however. LCDR Packard is the new assistant Operations
Department officer. He has just completed the Computer Systems Management
(CSM) curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey,
California. Although he has undergone postgraduate training in computer
technology, LCDR Packard has returned to VQ-7 for his department head tour
and has been assigned to a major department. This is an important milestone in an
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officer's career. Other officers with experience in computer technology include
the CO (a 1986 graduate of the CSM curriculum at NPS, Monterey, CA) and the
i
Communications Department Head (a 1989 graduate of the CSM curriculum at
NPS, Monterey, CA).
Department heads are routinely called upon to draft classified documents.
These documents often require input from several other department heads before
being editorialized and approved by the squadron CO. The current method of
handling classified draft documents is to hand carry them in a labeled folder to
each department head that needs to critique it. Several hours can be wasted,
without prior coordination, if the drafter of the document cannot locate and
receive input from the other department heads in a timely manner.
The implementation of a trusted network could improve the way classified
documents are handled. A trusted network can provide department heads with
the ability to elecuonically route classified documents to one another. Instead of
hand carrying a classified document from one department head to another, the
drafter of a document could send a copy of the document to each department
head simultaneously. Once criticized by a department head, the document can be
sent back to the drafter for correction.
B. TACAMO LAN
VQ-7 has recently relocated to Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. The move for VQ-7 incorporated several improvements to its existing
computing resources including the implementation of a LAN that connected all of
the major squadron departments within the new hangar facility. The
implementation of the LAN involved the use of VQ-7's existing desktop
computers and printers. Specific computer resource descriptions are not
necessary for this discussion and risk assessment.
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VQ-7's CO has tasked his ADP officer (LT Hines) with studying the
requirements for making VQ-7's LAN a trusted network capable of handling
information from unclassified up through secret. VQ-7's mission requires frequent
and simultaneous information processing at the classified levels of confidential
and secret. The department heads of VQ-7 are frequently called upon to draft
classified documents that require the input from other department heads and
ultimately the approval by the Executive Officer (XO) and CO. The CO is
interested in implementing a trusted network that will enable his department
heads to draft, route for input from others, and route for his final approval via
electronic means. The CO's goals are to improve the message drafting times,
minimize the threat of physically misplacing classified materials, and ensure that
his department heads use their time effectively and efficiently. The CO considers
the implementation of a trusted network to be critical to VQ-7's mission and
therefore wants it up and running in three months.
C. ADP OFFICER PLAN OF ATTACK
LT Hines is new to his job as the ADP officer and is unsure of where to begin.
After soliciting help from LCDR Packard and the Communications Department
head, LT Hines maps out a plan of attack for his tasking to implement a trusted
network. His initial plan includes three phases: Phase I - Determine the NCSC-
evaluation rating appropriate for the VQ-7 operational environment using the risk
assessment described in the TNIEG; Phase II - Identify, procure, and implement
the "trusted products" necessary to convert VQ-7's existing LAN into a trusted
network; and Phase III - Obtain an "interim authority to operate" from the
appropriate Designated Approving Authority (DAA) until formal certification
and accreditation can be accomplished per DoD Directive 5200.28.
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Since LT Hines is not familiar with these documents (the TNIEG, DoD
Directive 5200.28), LCDR Packard explains how and where to get copies.
LCDR Packard has worked with these documents and has offered to help LT
Hines as much as his job would allow.
Phase I of the LT Hines plan will be described in detail. Phase II and Phase
III, however, are considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis and provide
areas for future research.
D. PHASE I - TNI PART I RISK ASSESSMENT OF VQ-7
After obtaining copies of the required documents, LT Hines consults the
TNIEG for information regarding the risk assessment procedure that will help him
determine the recommended minimum security requirements for VQ-7's LAN. As
mentioned earlier, the TNIEG relies heavily on the procedure mandated by DoD
Directive 5200.28 Enclosure (4). LT Hines follows the six step risk assessment
procedure outlined in the TNIEG.
1. Step 1: Determine system security mode of operation.
Based on the CO's description of desired capabilities for VQ-7's trusted
network and the definitions of the different security modes, LT Hines determines
that the mode of operation needs to be multilevel. VQ-7's trusted network will
need to simultaneously handle multiple levels of classified information
(unclassified up through but not greater than secret) in an environment where not
all of the users have the clearance, authorization, or formal access approval
required. The security mode of operation selected will be verified by step 5.
2. Step 2: Determine minimum user clearance or authorization rating.
Using the Rating Scale for Minimum User Clearance (Rmin) (Table 2,
Chapter V), LT Hines determines the Rmin to be 1. VQ-7 is composed of several
departments that handle classified documents on a daily basis. However, there
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are some departments that provide administrative support to the squadron and do
not have a need to handle classified documents. The personnel that provide this
administrative support do not have the clearance to handle classified information
but do routinely have access to sensitive but unclassified information (e.g.,
squadron personnel social security numbers and home addresses).
3. Step 3: Determine maximum data sensitivity rating.
The CO stated his desire for a trusted network that would be capable of
handling multiple levels of classified information up to, but not greater than
secret. Additionally, VQ-7's information sensitivity is considered to be "without
categories." LT Hines uses this information to determine VQ-7's Rmax from Table
3 in Chapter V (Rating Scale for Maximum Data Sensitivity (Rmax)). LT Hines
finds that Table 3 assigns an Rmax rating of 3 for VQ-7's maximum data
sensitivity.
4. Step 4: Determine risk index.
LT Hines now uses the information obtained in steps two and three to
determine VQ-7's risk index. Using the formula provided in the TNIEG (Risk
Index = Rmax - Rmin), he calculated VQ-7's risk index to be 2 (Rmax (3) - Rmin
(D = 2).
5. Step 5: Determine minimum security evaluation class for computer-
based controls.
After LT Hines calculates VQ-7's risk index, he matches this number to
the Security Risk Index (Table 4, Chapter V) to verify the appropriate security
mode and determine the minimum NCSC-evaluation rating for the system. VQ-7's
risk index of 2 matches to a multilevel or partitioned security mode and a
minimum security class of B2. Descriptions of the different security modes are
provided in Appendix F. Since not all of VQ-7's personnel have clearance,
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authorization, or formal access approval for the information to be processed on
the LAN, the mulitlevel security mode is dictated by VQ-7's operational
environment.
6. Step 6: Determine adjustments to computer security evaluation class
required.
Step six involves a more detailed gathering of information about
environmental and architectural risk factors. It includes the analysis of the
applications environment and such factors as system allowance for programming
and potential restriction to limited sets of applications. This step is considered to
be beyond the scope of the ADP officer's assessment of VQ-7's needs at this time
and will not be included in further discussions.
E. PHASE I - TNI PART II RISK ASSESSMENT OF VQ-7
1. Functionality
Using the additional security services listed in TNI Part II (and the
questions provided in Appendix G), LT Hines determines the functionality
required (desired) by the CO. The CO answers these questions with the
assistance of LCDR Packard and the Communications Department head. The
CO's answers to the Part II questions (Appendix G) identify the desired
functionality for each security service. His answers are listed in Appendix I.
2. Strength of Mechanism
Since the risk index calculation for TNI Part II concerns the lowest
clearance of non-AIS users that have physical access to any AIS object in the
squadron, LT Hines has to consider all squadron personnel, visitors, and the
contract personnel that provide support services such as vending and janitorial
services. Although security policies require that all personnel without the proper
clearances be escorted by squadron personnel who do have clearance, these non-
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AIS users still obtain physical access to the squadron AIS. Using the Minimum
Clearance for Physical Access table (Table 6, Chapter V), LT Hines determines the
Rmin for Part II to be 0. The minimum clearance for personnel gaining physical
access to VQ-7's AIS is Uncleared or Not Authorized.
The Maximum Data Sensitivity table (Table 7, Chapter V), is identical to
table 3 used in the TNI Part I assessment of risk. The maximum data sensitivity
had not changed and therefore LT Hines determines the Rmax to be 3 (Rmax (3) -
Rmin (0) = 3).
Using Table 8 in Chapter V, LT Hines determines the Minimum Strength
of Mechanism Requirement for a TNI Part II risk index of 3. He matches the risk
index of 3 to Table 8 and finds that for all Part II security services selected for VQ-
7's computing environment, each service needs to have a "good" strength of
mechanism.
3. Assurance
LT Hines determines the minimum assurance requirements for each
security service using a similar procedure to the one used in the Part I evaluation
above. He matches the TNI Part II risk index of 3 to Table 9 (Chapter V),
Minimum Assurance Requirements, to determine the Part II assurance rating. LT
Hines notes that a Part II risk index of 3 identifies a need for a "good" assurance.
4. Part II Assurance Rating versus Minimum Part I Evaluation
To complete the risk assessment procedure, LT Hines draws a
comparison between the Part I evaluation and Part II assurance rating. Table 10
(Chapter V), Part II Assurance Rating, reveals that the Part II assurance rating of
"good" is matched to a minimum Part I evaluation of B2. Since Part I and Part II
evaluations calculate Rmin using different criteria, it would not be surprising to
end up with a difference in determined evaluation class (e.g., Bl from Pail I vs. B2
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from Part II). If a difference had occurred, LT Hines would have determined
whether VQ-7's operating environment dictates a Part I or Part II dominance. VQ-
7's Part I evaluation and selection of Part II security services, however, resulted in
the same NCSC-evaluation class of B2. The additional Part II services requested
by the CO do not dictate a different NCSC-evaluation class.
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VII. NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT: ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSIONS
A. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
The risk assessment procedure described in the TNIEG provided LT Hines
with a structured procedure for evaluating VQ-7's operating environment. It led
to the determination that the minimum NCSC-evaluation rating for VQ-7's LAN
should be B2. Once the evaluation class (B2) has been determined, the
requirements to meet this evaluation class are obtained from the TNI. The overall
description of class B2 (Structured Protection) as defined in the TNI [1987]
follows:
In class (B2) network systems, the NTCB is based on a clearly defined and
documented formal security policy model that requires the discretionary and
mandatory access control enforcement found in class (Bl) network systems to
be extended to all subjects and objects in the network system. In addition,
covert channels are addressed. The NTCB must be carefully structured into
protection-critical and non-protection-critical elements. The NTCB interface is
well-defined, and the NTCB design and implementation enable it to be
subjected to more thorough testing and more complete review.
Authentication mechanisms are strengthened, trusted facility management is
provided in the form of support for system administrator and operator
functions, and stringent configuration management conuols are imposed. The
system is relatively resistant to penetration. The following are minimal
requirements for system assigned a class (B2) rating.
A detailed description of the minimal requirements for a network system
rating of B2 are provided in the TNI. With this information, one of the next tasks
for the ADP officer involves a search for commercial computer security products
that have been evaluated by the NCSC and satisfy the requirements of both a B2
rating and the specific security services identified in the Part II evaluation.
Although the details of this process will not be discussed here, it provides a
potential area for future research.
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During the review of the computer security guidelines and directives that
govern the risk assessment process described in this thesis, an important
observation was made. The more recent publications in the Rainbow Series, such
as the NCSC -- A Guide to Understanding Information System Security Officer
Responsibilities for Automated Information Systems, identify an increasing
requirement for personnel with technical qualifications and experience at the
lower levels of the Navy's organization (e.g., aviation squadrons). The
proliferation of more complex information technology (e.g., LAN's, trusted
networks, and distributed databases) at the aviation squadron level brings with it
the need for technically qualified information technology managers and
administrators. At this time, there is no evidence that the Navy has recognized
this need. The following discussion provides clarity to this observation.
The general structure of the hypothetical squadron, VQ-7, can be considered
to be a typical "land-based" Navy squadron. As mentioned earlier, billets in the
squadron are typically assigned to officers for a duration that does not usually
exceed one year. Although this helps ensure that officers gain a wide variety of
experience and helps prevent burnout, it does not provide the squadron with a
stable, consistent manager of its Automated Information Systems (AISs) and AIS
activities. It can take a newly assigned ADP officer two to three months to
become familiar with his/her duties. During this time the squadron will continue
to operate without an experienced ADP manager. The training and familiarity
that a new ADP officer will receive is provided by the outgoing ADP officer in
the form of oral "job turnover" briefings that are conducted over a one to two
week period. After this time the new ADP officer is essentially on his/her own.
Since there are no formal training courses provided, the ADP officer's success in
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providing the squadron with an effective AIS manager is determined solely by
his/her personal abilities and motivation to learn the details of the squadron AIS.
Until the recent implementation of the LAN, VQ-7's ADP officer has only had
to deal with such tasks as procuring stand-alone desktop computer systems and
peripherals, writing and implementing simple squadron computer security policies,
and conducting computer security training for squadron personnel. During this
time, the squadron has been able to operate effectively while the new ADP officer
gained experience. The introduction of newer, more complex computer
technology (e.g., LANs, trusted networks), however, may not be conducive to the
constant (annual) turnover of ADP officers.
The increasing complexity of the computer technologies being implemented
in the Navy's aviation squadrons today (such as LANs) will soon demand ADP
personnel with more than just a novice level interest and experience. The person
who may be assigned to this type of billet in the near future will receive a new
title, Information System Security Officer (ISSO), and will be required to meet
certain technical qualifications of both knowledge and experience.
The management of these more complex computer systems will not only
require personnel with more technical qualifications, but the length of their
assignment to this type of billet will need to be more stable (longer than the
typical year). Some important questions come to mind. Where will these
technically qualified personnel come from? Will the use of military personnel in
these billets provide the needed stability? Will the use of civilians be needed or
required?
The people who will fill the ISSO type billets will have previously obtained a
computer technology subspecialty. Graduates of the computer technology
curricula at NPS Monterey, California are likely military candidates. Military
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personnel, however, may have obtained their subspecialty prior to entering the
Navy. Technically qualified civilian personnel are also viable candidates for ISSO
type billets.
If military officers are specifically assigned to an ISSO billet for a typical three
year tour, they will likely provide the necessary stability to the organizations
ISSO position. For military officers that have obtained their postgraduate
computer technology subspecialty while in the Navy, this type of assignment
would essentially be equated to a "payback" tour.
If an increasing demand for technically qualified computer personnel exceeds
the existing supply, it may be necessary to rely on the services of civilians in ISSO
type billets. This would certainly provide the needed stability for organizations
that are implementing more complex computer technology. However, the Navy's
budget has been reduced and it may be difficult to acquire specialized civilian
personnel when the Navy is mandating cut backs.
As the Navy's aviation squadrons (and other activities) continue to procure
and implement new computer technologies, it will certainly be necessary for them
to procure qualified personnel to manage them as well. The future requirement to
specifically assign officers with computer technology subspecialties to ISSO
billets at the lower levels of the Navy's organization may also provide new and
more diverse opportunities for postgraduate payback tours.
B. COMMENTS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The Technical Guidelines Program is an important effort by the NCSC to
channel the research and development of computer security. It has helped to
establish clear, common language references and a knowledge base of techniques
to be used in the implementation of computer security.
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The TNIEG provides a relatively straight-forward method for evaluating the
necessary level of trust that must be placed in a LAN. The Part I risk assessment
procedure provides a structured way to analyze how an organization's
operational environment dictates the minimum requirements for a trusted
network. The tables used in steps one through five are well defined and present a
clear definition of the minimum security class based on an organizations risk.
Step six of the Part I risk assessment procedure, however, is given little discussion.
It is intended to provide further refinement to the level of trust required as
determined in steps one through five. The NCSC identified the sixth step as a
necessary element of the risk assessment procedure, yet it fell short of completing
its description in sufficient detail. Instead of providing clarification of this step,
the TNIEG simply makes reference to other sources for elaboration. These
sources describe a detailed analysis and method to be used in determining the
potential need for adjustments to the initial security evaluation class already
determined in steps one through five. Without a more detailed discussion and
description of step six in the TNIEG, it is unable to provide a self contained
source of information and guidance concerning the entire risk assessment
procedure. (NCSC, 1990)
The security services outlined in Part II address security concerns that take
on increased significance in the network environment. Many of them are outside
the scope of Part I or lack theoretical basis and formal analysis underlying the Part
I assessment procedure. Although Part II of the risk assessment procedure is
discussed in some detail, it still requires further research and development. "... Part
II services have not been supported by equally well developed theories and
detailed evaluation criteria ..." (NCSC, 1990). As a result the criteria used are very
general and somewhat ambiguous. The TNIEG does provide sufficient detail,
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however, to identify and enumerate security services that an organization may
select for use in its specific environment. The tables used in Part II are also
straight forward and provide a relatively simple procedure for conducting the Part
II evaluation and for comparing the Part II results to those in the Part I evaluation.
Although the TNIEG provides one example of an operating environment that
might require a Part II dominance over Part I, it is unclear as to how this
dominance is determined in other cases. A more specific guideline or matrix
providing correlation between the different security operating modes and Part I
verses Part II dominance would be beneficial.
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The plan of attack that LT Hines developed in order to implement a trusted
network for VQ-7 involved three phases. Phase I (Determine the NCSC-
evaluation rating appropriate for the VQ-7 operational environment) was
addressed in this thesis. Detailed discussions of Phase II and Phase III, however,
are beyond the scope of this thesis and provide areas for future research efforts.
1. Phase II - Identify, procure, and implement "trusted products"
The sources for identifying trusted computer security products can
begin with two of the Rainbow Series publications, NCSC Trusted Product
Evaluation Questionnaire (NCSC-TG-019) of 1989 and NCSC Trusted Product
Evaluations - A Guide for Vendors (NCSC-TG-02) of 1990. In addition, the
Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue and the
Evaluated Products List (EPL) it contains will provide sources of information.
In 1990, the General Services Administration (GSA) began issuing a
series of guides on Federal information resources (IR) acquisitions. The guides
are designed to address important aspects of laws, regulations, directives, and
policies that establish Federal acquisition requirements. The first of this series. The
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Overview Guide, was published in 1990 and provides a description of the
acquisition process and the roles and responsibilities of program managers,
information resource management, and contracting personnel. This document
and others in the series can provide the necessary information for a detailed
discussion on information resource acquisition.
2. Phase III - Certification and accreditation (C & A) of trusted systems
DoD Directive 5200.28 directs that a certification plan be designed and
implemented in support of the accreditation process. It is to involve a risk
analysis of the AIS in its operational environment, an evaluation of the security
safeguards, and a certification report. All of these milestones must be approved
by the appropriate DAA before classified information may be processed on a
trusted network. (DoD, 1988)
DoD Directive 5200.28 also specifies a timetable that shall be adhered to
in identifying and implementing required security features. This directive was
issued in 1988 and mandated that complete compliance would be required for: (1)
existing systems that have already been accredited, within three years from the
date of the directive, or (2) new systems, within three years from the date that a
system began the design phase of the life-cycle process. (DoD, 1988)
This directive provides for exceptions to its mandated requirements,
however. It allows the appropriate DAA to authorize exceptions based on
excessive costs of implementation, time constraints of implementation, unsound
technical applications of needed security features, or adverse impact on
operational effectiveness to an unacceptable degree. The DAA can authorize any
or all of these exceptions provided that other safeguards (e.g., physical controls,
administrative controls, etc.) can be substituted to attain the required level of
system security or protection. (DoD, 1988)
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Unfortunately, at the time of its issuance, DoD Directive 5200.28 failed
to specify any details concerning the C & A process itself. It simply dictated that
activities comply with its contents. The NCSC is only now producing a rough
draft technical guideline that introduces C & A concepts in any detail. In short,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued this directive before the NCSC had
developed the procedures and guidance for preparing for, obtaining, and
conducting C & A's. The C & A guidance prepared thus far by the NCSC has yet
to be formally issued for use. As a result, most activities have obtained waivers
from their respective DAA's in order to operate their trusted systems prior to
obtaining/achieving certification and accreditation. (Campbell, 1992)
D. FINAL REMARKS
This thesis has described and applied the NCSC's risk assessment
methodology to a hypothetical Naval aviation squadron. The results of this
assessment identified an NCSC-evaluation class rating appropriate to the
squadron's operational environment. The determined NCSC-evaluation class
rating (B2) was briefly described and additional NCSC references were cited for
elaboration of the specific requirements of this rating.
Other steps, or phases, that might logically follow the NCSC's risk assessment
procedure were identified and described briefly. A more detailed discussion of
these phases can serve as areas for future research.
An observation concerning the qualifications and experience of personnel
assigned to the information technology billets of Naval aviation squadrons
identified a factor that may result in potential risk. Personnel that are currently
assigned to AIS billets within an aviation squadron do not necessarily meet any
specific technical qualification requirements or experience. This situation could
make it extremely difficult to effectively and efficiently design, acquire, and
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manage newer, more complex information technologies. Additionally, this
situation may put the Navy at risk of wasting its resources on unsuitable
technologies.
If the Navy continues its course towards implementing more complex
information technology at its lower levels, it will need to ensure that the
personnel at those levels have the requisite qualifications. The Navy needs to
detail qualified personnel to its lower levels ahead of the requirement or desire to
design newer, more complex information systems. This will help prevent the
design, procurement, and implementation of inadequate information technology
(and their security mechanisms) due to a lack of inexperience or knowledge. As
mentioned earlier, computer security efforts continue to lag far behind the rapid
growth of computer technology in general. Without properly qualified personnel
at the squadron level driving information technology and computer security
development (at the beginning of its life cycle), implementation, and management,





This thesis does not contain tutorial information on security and networking
issues. It is assumed that the reader will have some background in both areas.
The references listed below provide background and associated information on
security in networks:
Abrams, M.D. and Podell, H.J., Computer and Network Security: a Tutorial , IEEE
Computer Society Press. 1987.
Comer, D.E., Internetworking with TCP/IP . Prentice-Hall, 1991.
Davies, D.W. and Price, W.L., Security for Computer Networks . John Wiley &
Sons, 1984.
Denning, D.E., Cryptography and Data Security , Addison-Wesley, 1983.
Gasser, M., Building a Secure Computer System . Van Nostrand Reinhold
Company, 1988.
Pfleeger, C.P., Security in Computing , Prentice-Hall, 1989.
Russell, Deborah, and Gangemi Sr., G.T., Computer Security Basics . O'Reilly &
Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA, 1991.
Schatt, S., Understanding Local Area Networks , Second Edition, Howard W. Sams
& Company, 1990.




The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) was formed to continue the
efforts which began with the DoD Computer Security Initiative. The NCSC was
chartered by DoD to encourage the widespread availability of trusted computer
systems for use by those who process classified or other sensitive information.
The NCSC was specifically tasked with the following goals:
* Encourage the widespread availability of trusted computer systems.
* Evaluate the technical protection capabilities of industry- and government-
developed systems.
* Provide technical support of government and industry groups engaged in
computer security research and development.
* Develop technical criteria for the evaluation of computer systems.
* Evaluate commercial systems.
* Conduct and sponsor research in computer and network security
technology.
* Develop and provide access to verification and analysis tools used to
develop and test secure computer systems.
* Conduct training in areas of computer security.
* Disseminate computer security information to other branches of the federal
government and to industry. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
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APPENDIX C
OVERVIEW OF COMPUTER SECURITY REGULATIONS, POLICIES
AND CRITERIA
A. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
National mandates require the protection of sensitive information, as listed
below:
* Title 18, U.S. Code 1905, makes it unlawful for any office or employee of the
U.S. Government to disclose information of an official nature except as
provided by law, including data processed by computer systems.
* Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A- 130 establishes
requirements for Federal agencies to protect sensitive data.
* Public Law 100-235, The Computer Security Act of 1987, creates a means for
establishing minimum acceptable security practices for systems processing
sensitive information.
* Executive Order 12356 prescribes a uniform system for classifying,
declassifying, and safeguarding national security information.
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY POLICY
DoD Directive 5200.28, Security Requirements for Automated Information
Systems (AISs), is the overall computer security policy document for the DoD.
The document identifies mandatory and minimum AIS security requirements,
each agency may issue its own supplementary instructions. For DoD agencies,
these instructions fall within the scope of the DoD guidelines and add more
specificity. Additional requirements may be necessary for selected systems, based
on risk assessments.
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Additional security documents are:
* Department of Defense 5220. 22-M, Industrial Security Manual for
Safeguarding Classified Information.
* Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 50-4, Security of
Compartmented Computer Operations.
* Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/16, Security Policy for
Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in Automated Information
Systems and Networks.
* The Supplement to DCID 1/16, Security Manual for Uniform Protection of
Intelligence Processed in Automated Information Systems and Networks.
* National Security Agency/Cendal Security Service (NSA/CSS) Manual 130-1,
The NSA/CSS Operational Computer Security Manual.
* Air Force Regulation (AFR) 205-16, Computer Security Policy.
* Army Regulation (AR) 380-19, Security: Information Systems Security.
* Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 5239.1 A, Automatic
Data Processing Security Program.
C. SECURITY STANDARDS
As previously discussed, the NCSC is responsible for establishing and
maintaining technical standards and criteria for the evaluation of trusted
computer systems. The Orange Book (TCSEC) defines technical security criteria
for evaluating general purpose AISs. The TCSEC became a DoD standard in
1985 and is mandatory for all DoD components. The TCSEC rates computer
systems based on an evaluation of their security features and assurances. The
TNI interprets the TCSEC for networks and provides guidance for selecting and
specifying other security services (e.g., communications integrity, denial of
service, and transmission security). (NCSC, 1992)
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APPENDIX D
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF USER CLEARANCES AND DATA
SENSITIVITIES
This appendix describes in detail the clearances and data sensitivities (e.g.,
classification) introduced earlier in this thesis.
A. CLEARANCES
This section defines increasing levels of clearance or authorization of system
users. System users include no only those users with direct connections to the
system but also those users without direct connections who might receive output
or generate input that is not reliably reviewed for classification by a responsible
individual.
* Uncleared (U)--Personnel with no clearance or authorization. Permitted
access to any information for which there are no specified controls, such as
openly published information.
* Unclassified Information (N)--Personnel who are authorized access to
sensitive unclassified (e.g., For Official Use Only (FOUO)) information, either
by an explicit official authorization or by an implicit authorization derived
from official assignments or responsibilities.
* Confidential Clearance (C)—Requires U.S. citizenship and typically some
limited records checking. In some cases, a National Agency Check (NAC) is
required (e.g., for U.S. citizens employed by colleges or universities).
Secret Clearance (S)--Typically requires a NAC, which consists of searching
the Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprint and investigative files and the
Defense Central Index of Investigations. In some cases, further investigation
is required.
Top Secret Clearance based on a current Background Investigation (TS(BI))-
-Requires an investigation that consists of a NAC, personal contacts, record
searches, and written inquiries. A BI typically includes an investigation
extending back 5 years, often with a spot check investigation extending
back 15 years.
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* Top Secret Clearance based on a current Special Background Investigation
(TS(SBI))-Requires an investigation that, in addition to the investigation for
a BI, includes additional checks on the subject's immediate family (if foreign
born) and spouse and neighborhood investigations to verify each of the
subject's former residences in the United States where he resided six months
or more. An SBI typically includes an investigation extending back 15 years.
* One category (1C) - In addition to a TS(SBI) clearance, written authorization
for access to one category of information is required. Authorizations are the
access rights granted to a user by a responsible individual (e.g., security
officer).
* Multiple categories (MC) - In addition to TS(SBI) clearance, written
authorization for access to multiple categories of information is required.
B. DATA SENSITIVITIES
Increasing levels of data sensitivity are defined as follows:
* Unclassified (U)--Data that is not sensitive or classified: publicly releasable
information within a computer system. Note that such data might still require
discretionary access controls to protect it from accidental destruction.
* Not Classified but Sensitive (N)-Unclassified but sensitive data. Much of
this is FOUO data, which is that unclassified data that is exempt from release
under the Freedom of Information Act. This includes data such as the
following:
- Manuals for DoD investigators or auditors.
- Examinations questions and answers used in determination of the
qualification of candidates for employment or promotion.
- Data that a statute specifically exempts from disclosure, such as Patent
Secrecy data.
- Data containing trade secrets or commercial or financial information.
- Data containing internal advice or recommendations that reflect the
decision-making process of an agency.
- Data in personnel, medical, or other files that, if disclosed, would result in
an invasion of personal privacy.
- DoD Directive 5400.7 prohibits any material other than that cited in FOI
Act exemptions from being considered or marked FOUO. One other
form of unclassified sensitive data is that pertaining to unclassified
technology with military application. This refers primarily to documents
that are controlled under the Scientific and Technical Information
Program or acquired under the Defense Technical Data Management
Program. In addition to specific requirements for protection of particular
forms of unclassified sensitive data there are two general mandates. The
first is Title 18, U.S. Code 1905, which makes it unlawful for any office




official nature except as provided buy law, including when such
information is in the form of data handled by computer systems. Official
data is data that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control
of the DoD. The second is Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-71, Transmittal Memorandum Number 1, which establishes
requirements for Federal agencies to protect sensitive data.
Confidential (C)— Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national
security.
Secret (S)--Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security.
Top Secret (TS)— Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to
the national security.
One Category (1C)-Applied to Top Secret Special Intelligence information
(e.g., Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) or operational information
(e.g., Single Integrated Operational Plan/Extremely Sensitive Information
(SIOP/ESI)) that requires special controls for restrictive handling. Access to
such information requires authorization by the office responsible for the
particular compartment. Compartments also exist at the C and S levels.
Multiple Categories (MC)--Applied to Top Secret Special Intelligence or
operational information that requires special controls for restrictive handling.
This sensitivity level differs from the 1C level only in that there are multiple
compartments involved. The number can vary from two to many, with






1 Where the number of categories is large or where a highly sensitive
category is involved, a higher rating might be warranted.
2 The only categories of concern are those for which some users are not
authorized access. When counting the number of categories, count all
categories regardless of the sensitivity level associated with the data. If a
category is associated with more than one sensitivity level, it is only counted
at the highest level. Systems in which all data are in the same category are
treated as without categories.
3 Unclassified data by definition may not contain categories.
4 Examples of N data include financial, proprietary, privacy, and mission-
sensitive data. In some situations (e.g., those involving extremely large
financial sums or critical mission-sensitive data), a higher rating may be
warranted. This table prescribes minimum ratings.
5 The rating increment between the Secret and Top Secret data sensitivity
levels is greater than the increment between other adjacent levels. This
difference derives from the fact that the loss of Top Secret data causes
EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE damage to U.S. national security, whereas the
loss of Secret data causes SERIOUS damage. (NCSC, 1990)
TABLE 4
1 Although there is no prescribed minimum class, the integrity and denial of
service requirements of many systems warrant at least class C2 protection.
2 Automated markings on output must not be relied on to be accurate unless
at least class Bl is used.
3 Where an AIS handles classified or compartmented data and some users do
not have at least a Confidential clearance, or when there are more that two
types of compartmented information being handled, at least a class B2 is
required.
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4 The asterisk (*) indicates that computer protection for environments with
that risk index is considered to be beyond the state of current computer
security technology.




Part II evaluations are qualitative, as compared with the hierarchically-ordered
ratings (e.g., CI, C2, ...) from the TCSEC. The results of a Part II evaluation for
offered services are generally summarized using the terms "none", "minimum",
"fair", and "good". For some services, functionality is summarized using "none"
or "present" because gradations are not meaningful. The term "none" is used to
mean the security service fails to distinguish the strength of mechanism. The
term "not offered" is used when a security service is not offered. For example, if
a certain network did not include non-repudiation as one of its security services,
that network would be rated "not offered" with respect to non-repudiation.
TABLE 7
1 Where the number of categories is large or where a highly sensitive
category is involved, a higher rating might be warranted.
2 The only categories of concern are those for which some users are not
authorized access. When counting the number of categories, count all
categories regardless of the sensitivity level associated with the data. If a
category is associated with more than one sensitivity level, it is only counted
at the highest level. Systems in which all data are in the same category are
treated as without categories.
3 Unclassified data by definition may not contain categories.
4 Examples of N data include financial, proprietary, privacy, and mission-
sensitive data. In some situations (e.g., those involving extremely large
financial sums or critical mission-sensitive data), a higher rating may be
warranted. This table prescribes minimum ratings.
5 The rating increment between the Secret and Top Secret data sensitivity
levels is greater than the increment between other adjacent levels. This
difference derives from the fact that the loss of Top Secret data causes
EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE damage to U.S. national security, whereas the





SYSTEM SECURITY MODES OF OPERATION
The system security mode of operation for an AIS is determined as follows:
Dedicated Security Mode : An AIS is defined as operating in the dedicated
security mode if all users have the clearance or authorization, documented
formal access approval, if required, and the need-to-know for all information
handled by the AIS. The AIS may handle a single classification level and/or
category of information or a range of classification levels and/or categories.
The AIS shall be isolated electrically, logically and physically from all
personnel and AISs not possessing the requisite clearance or authorization,
formal access approval, if required, and need-to-know for all of the
information handled by the AIS.
System High Security Mode : An AIS is defined as operating in the system
high security mode if all users have the clearance or authorization and
documented formal access approval, if required, but not necessarily the need-
to-know for all information handled by the AIS.
Multilevel Security Mode : An AIS is defined as operating in the multilevel
security mode if not all users have the clearance, authorization, or formal
access approval, if required, for all information handled by the AIS.
Partitioned Security Mode : An AIS is defined as operating in the partitioned
security mode if all users possess the clearance, but not necessarily a formal
access approval, for all information handled by the AIS. (DoD, 1988)
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APPENDIX G
TNI PART n QUESTIONS
This appendix asks questions about each of the security services contained in
Part II of the TNI. These questions are designed to help the security manager
identify the functionality required for each security service. The questions should
be answered in sequence, unless the answer to one question contains an
instruction to skip ahead. (NCSC, 1990)
A. AUTHENTICATION
1. Is there a requirement to determine what individual, process or device is at
the other end of a network communication? If yes, document this
requirement. If no, skip to Communications Field Integrity.
2. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the specific
hardware device at the distant end-point involved in the network
communication?
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for authentication. This
functionality may be implemented at one or more protocol layer. For
example, a specific control character, ENQ (enquiry or who-are-you) may
be used to return immediately a stored terminal identifier.
3. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the location of
the hardware at the distant end-point or in any intermediate system
involved in the network communication?
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for authentication at
protocol layer 2, the Link Layer or layer 3, the Network Layer.
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4. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the specific
operating system or control program at the distant end-point or in any
intermediate system involved in the network communication?
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for authentication at
protocol layer 4, the Transport Layer.
5. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the subject
(process/domain pair) at the distant end-point involved in the network
communication?
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for authentication at
protocol layer 4 or above.
6. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the application or
user at the distant end-point involved in the network communication?
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for authentication above
protocol layer 7, the Applications Layer. The Applications Layer provides
an interface to the application. Authentication information may pass over
this interface. Authentication of a user is addressed in Part I of the TNI.
Application process authentication is outside the scope of the OSI
Security Architecture, but does fall within the scope of TNI Part II
Security Services.
Have you chosen to use some mechanism other than encryption to
provide authentication? If so, your strength of mechanism is shown in
Table 8.
If your authentication mechanism is encryption based, see appropriate
encryption authority (e.g., NSA). Even if encryption is used, some
supporting processes may need to satisfy the strength of mechanism
shown in Table 8 (depending on the architecture). For example, a
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database that relates encryption keys to specific users may need to be
trusted.
B. COMMUNICATIONS FIELD INTEGRITY
1. Do you have a requirement to protect communication against
unauthorized modification?
If no, skip to Non-Repudiation.
2. Are your protection requirements the same for all pails of the information
communicated?
If no, then you should identify the separate parts and answer the rest of
the questions in this section separately for each part. Each part is known
as a field.
There are two major fields: protocol-information, wherein the network is
informed of the destination of the information and any special services
required; and user-data. Not every protocol data unit (PDU) contains
user-data, but protocol-information is necessary. Each of these fields may
be divided into additional fields; depending on you application,
protection requirements for fields may differ.
3. Do you have a requirement for detecting unauthorized modification to
part or all of a PDU?
If yes, you have a requirement for at least minimum functionality.
4. Do you have a requirement for detecting any of the following forms of
message stream modification: insertion, deletion, or replay?
If yes, you have a requirement for at least fair functionality. In addition,
your functionality must be incorporated in a connection oriented
protocol.
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5. Do you require that, if message stream modification is detected, recovery
(correction) should be attempted?
If yes, you have a requirement for good functionality. In addition, you
must implement integrity in a reliable transport (layer 4) mechanism.
C. NON-REPUDIATION
1. Do you have a requirement to be able to prove (to a third party) that a
specific message transfer actually occurred?
If no, skip to Denial of Service.
2. Do you have a requirement for proving that a specific message was sent?
Specific message means that the identity of the subject sending the
message, the host computer and/or mail agent/server, time and date, and
contents are all uniquely and unalterable identified.
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for non-repudiation with
proof of origin.
3. Do you have a requirement for proving that a specific message was
received? Specific message means that the identity of the subject
sending the message, the host computer and/or mail agent/server, time and
date, and contents are all uniquely and unalterable identified.
If yes, then you have a functionality requirement for non-repudiation with
proof of delivery.
D. DENIAL OF SERVICE
1. Do you have a requirement to assure the availability of communications
service or to determine when a Denial of Service (DOS) condition exits?
A DOS condition is defined to exist whenever throughput falls below a
pre-established threshold, or when access to a remote entity is unavailable,
or when resources are not available to users on an equitable basis. For a
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DOS condition to occur, the user must have priority to access the system
or resources.
If no, skip to Data Confidentiality.
2. Do you have a requirement to detect conditions that would degrade
service below a pre-selected minimum and to report such degradation to
the network operators?
If yes, you have a requirement for at least minimum denial of service
functionality.
3. Could failure of the system to operate for several minutes lead to personal
injury or large financial loss?
If yes, you have a requirement for at least fair denial of service
functionality.
4. Do you have a requirement for service resiliency that would continue-
perhaps in a degraded or prioritized mode--in the event of equipment
failure and/or unauthorized actions?
If yes, you have a requirement for at least fair denial of service
functionality.
5. Could failure of your system to operate for several minutes lead to loss of
life?
If yes, you have a requirement for good denial of service functionality.
6. Do you have a requirement for automatic adaptation upon detection of a
denial-of-service condition?
If yes, you have a requirement for good denial of service functionality.
E. PROTOCOL BASED DOS PROTECTION
1. Do you want advanced knowledge of unavailability of service?
If no, skip to Network Management.
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If yes, do you want to implement alternatives?
If yes, you should employ this alternative basis and skip to Network
Management.
2. In general, ordinary protocol mechanisms don't provide protection against
malicious attacks or bizarre errors. Do you have a requirement to detect a
DOS condition which cannot be met by the protocols used as part of
normal communications?
If no, you do not have a functional requirement for protocol-based DOS
protection and should skip to Network Management.
3. The TNI suggests the following protocol-based mechanisms:
a. Measure the transmission rate between peer entities under conditions
of input queuing, and compare the measured transmission rate with a rate
previously identified as the minimum acceptable;
b. Employ a request-response polling mechanism, such as "are-you-there"
and "here-I-am" messages, to verify that an open path exists between peer
entities.
If you have identified any additional mechanisms, include them in your list
of required mechanisms.
NETWORK MANAGEMENT
1. Do you have a requirement for (at least) detecting a denial of service
condition that affects more than a single instance of communication, or
attempted communication?
If no, skip to Data Confidentiality.




1. Do you have a requirement to protect any part of transmitted data from
disclosure to unauthorized persons?
If no, skip to Traffic Flow Confidentiality.
2. Is your requirement for confidentiality limited to selected field of user-data
within a PDU?
If no, then you require confidentiality for the entire data portion of each
PDU. Continue with Traffic Flow Confidentiality.
3. Is there a reason to encrypt only selected fields (e.g., cost savings, legal
requirements)?
If yes, you require selected field confidentiality. If no, you require full
confidentiality on the data portion of each PDU.
H. TRAFFIC FLOW CONFIDENTIALITY
1. Do you have a requirement to prevent analysis of message length,
frequency, and protocol components (such as addresses) to prevent
information disclosure through inference (traffic analysis)?
If no, skip to Selective Routing.
If yes, you have functional requirement for traffic flow confidentiality.
I. SELECTIVE ROUTING
1. Do you have a requirement to choose or avoid specific networks, links,
relays, or other devices for any reason at any time?

























VQ-7 CO ANSWERS TO TNI PART II QUESTIONS
A. AUTHENTICATION
1. Is there a requirement to determine what individual, process or device is at
the other end of a network communication? Yes.
2. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the specific
hardware device at the distant end-point involved in the network
communication?
Yes, VQ-7 has a functional requirement for authentication. This
functionality may be implemented at one or more protocol layer. The
answers to the following questions will provide this information.
3. Do you have a requirement to identify and authenticate the location of
the hardware at the distant end-point or in any intermediate system
involved in the network communication?
Yes, VQ-7 has a functional requirement for authentication at protocol
layer 2, the Link Layer or layer 3, the Network Layer.
B. COMMUNICATIONS FIELD INTEGRITY
1. Do you have a requirement to protect communication against
unauthorized modification? Yes.
2. Are your protection requirements the same for all parts of the information
communicated? Yes.
3. Do you have a requirement for detecting unauthorized modification to




1. Do you have a requirement to be able to prove (to a third party) that a
specific message transfer actually occurred? Yes.
2. Do you have a requirement for proving that a specific message was sent?
Specific message means that the identity of the subject sending the
message, the host computer and/or mail agent/server, time and date, and
contents are all uniquely and unalterable identified. Yes, VQ-7 has a
functional requirement for non-repudiation with proof of origin.
3. Do you have a requirement for proving that a specific message was
received? Specific message means that the identity of the subject
sending the message, the host computer and/or mail agent/server, time and
date, and contents are all uniquely and unalterable identified. Yes, VQ-7
has a functional requirement for non-repudiation with proof of delivery.
D. DENIAL OF SERVICE
1. Do you have a requirement to assure the availability of communications
service or to determine when a Denial of Service (DOS) condition exits?
A DOS condition is defined to exist whenever throughput falls below a
pre-established threshold, or when access to a remote entity is unavailable,
or when resources are not available to users on an equitable basis. For a
DOS condition to occur, the user must have priority to access the system
or resources. Yes.
2. Do you have a requirement to detect conditions that would degrade
service below a pre-selected minimum and to report such degradation to
the network operators?
Yes, VQ-7 has a requirement for at least minimum denial of service
functionality.
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3. Could failure of the system to operate for several minutes lead to personal
injury or large financial loss? No.
4. Do you have a requirement for service resiliency that would continue-
perhaps in a degraded or prioritized mode--in the event of equipment
failure and/or unauthorized actions? No.
5. Could failure of your system to operate for several minutes lead to loss of
life? No.
6. Do you have a requirement for automatic adaptation upon detection of a
denial-of-service condition? No.
E. PROTOCOL BASED DOS PROTECTION
1. Do you want advanced knowledge of unavailability of service?
No, skip to Network Management.
F. NETWORK MANAGEMENT
1. Do you have a requirement for (at least) detecting a denial of service
condition that affects more than a single instance of communication, or
attempted communication? Yes, VQ-7 has a functional requirement for
network management denial of service protection.
G. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY
1. Do you have a requirement to protect any part of transmitted data from
disclosure to unauthorized persons? Yes.
2. Is your requirement for confidentiality limited to selected field of user-data
within a PDU'7 Yes.
3. Is there a reason to encrypt only selected fields (e.g., cost savings, legal
requirements)? Yes, VQ-7 requires selected field confidentiality.
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H. TRAFFIC FLOW CONFIDENTIALITY
1. Do you have a requirement to prevent analysis of message length,
frequency, and protocol components (such as addresses) to prevent
information disclosure through inference (traffic analysis)? Yes, VQ-7 has
a functional requirement for traffic flow confidentiality.
I. SELECTIVE ROUTING
1. Do you have a requirement to choose or avoid specific networks, links,
relays, or other devices for any reason at any time?
Yes, VQ-7 has a possible functional requirement for selective routing.
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